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CHAPTER 7 
Contesting Animal Experiments through Ethics 
and Epistemology: In Defense of a Political Critique 
of Animal Experimentation 
Arianna Ferrari 
Head of Strategy and Content, Futurium gGmbH, Berlin, Germany 
arianna.ferrari@posteo.de 
1 Introduction 
Generally, an animal experiment can be defined as an intervention on an 
animal, which causes suffering, harm, and distress, for scientific purposes. In 
this definition, animal experiments differ from more general scientific inves­
tigations concerning animals, such as observational studies in the wild in the 
fields of ethology or conservation, in which animals are involved but may not 
be harmed. Nowadays, the use of the term vivisection, in the case of animal ex­
periments, is very controversial. This term originally referred to the cutting of 
living bodies for scientific purposes and has a long conceptual history (Maehle, 
1992 ). In ancient times, it was used for referring to experiments on animals 
as well as on humans. Only in modern times, it became a colloquial term for 
all animal experiments and was much used by opponents in the nineteenth 
century, as the criticism of animal experiments became organized in a politi­
cal movement (Maehle, 1990 ). Many opponents to animal experiments, nowa­
days, use the term deliberately in a political sense, connecting to past animal 
protection movements ( e.g., the international Citizens' Initiative Stop Vivisec­
tion, cf. Rippe, 2009 ). Animal experimenters, on the other hand, oppose the 
term on the grounds that there is no chirurgical exploration of living animals 
in experiments ( e.g., German Research Foundation, DFG, 2016). 
Currently, animals are used in different ways for scientific purposes: they 
are used in basic research; in education in a variety of biomedical disciplines, 
including veterinary medicine; as so-called disease models, to mimic different 
diseases, mostly human ones; as test subjects in different test settings; in vet­
erinary medicine; in behavioral and cognitive ethological studies; as bioreac­
tors to produce fluids or bodily parts which contain therapeutic substances 
for human beings (i.e., "gene-pharming"); and as sources of cells, tissues, and 
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organs for human transplantation. Although the capturing, handling, trans­
porting, confining, and breeding of animals are relevant parts of the practice 
of animal experimentation, they are not explicitly indicated in many laws as 
animal experiments. This constitutes a problem because these practices cause 
major distress in animals. Furthermore, the act of breeding animals for sci­
entific purposes, which has become unavoidable (with rare exceptions), since 
it ensures the standardization and reproducibility of experimental results ( cf. 
Ferrari, 2008), must be considered an ethical issue. In the practice of animal 
experimentation, individuals are materially formed in their identity as experi­
mental living beings. These animals are often born with specific characteris­
tics suited to scientific experiments (see Linzey and Linzey, 2015). The fact that 
breeding is not classified as an animal experiment affects the perception of the 
suffering and the number of animals used for research. For example, in experi­
ments that make use of genetically altered animals, many individuals are used 
for the realization and maintenance of a, so-called, transgenic animal line, and 
are not counted in the statistics. Furthermore, many transgenic lines are bred 
in commercial facilities to be ready for use, so that scientists can order them 
from a catalogue. 
This chapter offers a framework for building a convincing critique of animal 
experimentation. In order to do so, it first explores the framework that justifies 
animal experiments in the current debate, which relies both on scientific and 
ethical arguments. It then analyzes the main arguments developed to oppose 
animal experiments, in terms of epistemic and ethical arguments. Although 
valuable, these arguments present some pitfalls when considered separately. 
The chapter concludes that a convincing critique of animal experimentation 
must be political. 
2 How Is the Practice of Animal Experiments Currently Justified? 
Although animal experiments are carried out all over the world, in most cases 
their use is not mandatory. Their main goal is to protect human beings, though 
protecting non-human animal health and the environment are also goals. This 
chapter presents the argument that the obligation to perform animal experi­
ments comes from a commonly accepted experimental culture, which is justi­
fied on the basis of ethical and epistemic arguments relating to human gains. 
In the writings which justify animal experiments, often the need to protect 
human safety is of primary concern. The apparent unavoidability of animal 
experiments is explained, first through reference to historical arguments and, 
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second, through the irreducibility of, so-called, in vivo experiments to other 
methods ( e.g., in vitro, in silico, or computer modelling). For example, the Royal 
Society (2004) has argued that almost every medical achievement in the twen­
tieth century relied on the use of animals in some way. The German Research 
Foundation (DFG, 2016), in its paper on animal experiments, maintains that 
even sophisticated computers are unable to model interactions between mol­
ecules, cells, tissues, organs, organisms, and the environment. It is argued that 
animal experiments result from a cost-benefit-analysis, in which the costs for 
animals have to be balanced with the benefits for the protection of human 
health and the environment. 
The Principles of Humane Experimental Technique (Russell and Burch, 1959) 
is one of the first documents on the ethical rationale of animal experiments 
and has become a milestone in the politics of alternative methods. Russell 
and Burch formed the basis for a new applied science that would improve or 
substitute the treatment of laboratory animals, while advancing the quality 
of science in studies that use animals. They claimed that this science must be 
inspired by the three principles of replacement, reduction, and refinement with 
regard to the use of animals. It is important to note that Russell and Burch's 
intent was ethical, but their methods were descriptive and empirical, not nor­
mative. Russell and Burch were inspired by the goal, stated by the Universities 
Federation for Animal Welfare (uFAw) in the United Kingdom, to promote, so­
called, humane behavior, consisting of reducing pain and fear inflicted upon 
animals (Tannenbaum and Bennett, 2015). The method of replacing, reducing, 
or refining the use of animals in studies was defined as an empirical approach. 
According to this method, inhumanity was associated with physical or psycho­
logical distress, unnecessary or avoidable pain, fear, stress, anxiety, and bodi­
ly discomfort. However, for Russell and Burch, the goal of lessening distress 
(inhumanity) in scientific procedures was always subordinate to the goals of 
conducting science and achieving scientific and medical progress. Russell and 
Burch, indeed, were not criticizing the use of animals in research as such, but 
promoted methods to reduce and, whenever possible, eliminate animal dis­
tress consistent with the conduct of sound science. Although the concept of 
alternatives was not present in their 1959 book, the 3Rs have been the founda­
tion for the development of alternative methods, which were formally intro­
duced by Smyth ( 1978) in Alternatives to Animal Experiments ( see Tannenbaum 
and Bennet, 2015). Smyth defined an alternative as any change in experimental 
methods that results in the application of the 3Rs. Since then, there has been 
an ongoing debate on the different definitions of these principles and how to 
apply them to scientific procedures (see e.g., Tannenbaum and Bennett, 2015); 
but the core of the message remains in favor of animal experiments. Indeed, 
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more recently, Russell described the word alternative as "unfortunate" because 
it suggests only 1R (Russell, 2005). 
The justification of animal experiments has been explained in the clearest 
and strongest manner in the case of biomedical research. One of the most 
quoted documents is the Nuremberg Code, which followed the Nuremberg 
Trials after World War 11. The Nuremberg Code states that, "The experiment 
should be so designed and based on the results of animal experimenta­
tion and a knowledge of the natural history of the disease or other prob­
lem under study that the anticipated results will justify the performance 
of the experiment" (Shuster, 1997, p. 1436). Another widely used document 
is the Declaration of the World Medical Association on the Ethical Principles 
for Medical Research Involving Human Subjects, first formulated in Helsinki in 
1964 (World Medical Association, 1964 ). This Declaration was formulated as 
a response to the monstrous threats to humanity during World War 11, and 
it defined the role of animal experiments prior to human exposure: "Medical 
research involving human subjects must conform to generally accepted scien­
tific principles, be based on a thorough knowledge of the scientific literature, 
other relevant sources of information, and adequate laboratory and, as ap­
propriate, animal experimentation. The welfare of animals used for research 
must be respected". Now known as the Helsinki Declaration, it establishes the 
ethical obligation to carry out animal experiments when results from these 
experiments are necessary and unavoidable at a given time by the scientific 
community. 
In 2010, inspired by the Helsinki Declaration, which changed the landscape 
of human experimentation, a group of scientists (approximately 4500 individ­
uals, at the time of writing) formulated the Basel Declaration ( 2010) "to further 
advance the implementation of ethical principles such as the 3Rs whenever 
animals are being used and to call for more trust, transparency and commu­
nication on the sensitive topic of animals in research". The Basel Declaration 
states the necessity of animal experiments to meet fundamental scientific 
challenges ( such as human and non-human animal diseases and protection of 
the environment), and that the necessity will remain in the foreseeable future 
for biomedical research. The first principle of the Basel Declaration is "to re­
spect and protect the animals entrusted to us and not inflict unnecessary pain, 
suffering, or harm to them by adhering to highest standards of experimental 
design and animal care". This is very similar in scope and intent to the 3Rs. 
The principles that follow provide specific care in particular scientific prac­
tices, such as the creation and use of genetically modified animals or the use of 
animals in education (Basel Declaration, 2010 ). The German Research Founda­
tion (DFG) explains the ethics of animal experimentation through, so-called, 
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patho-inclusive ethics, which they define as follows: "It is not only reconcilable 
with valuing human interests over those of sentient animals but also with the 
position that other human interests, such as life and health, knowledge gain, 
and pleasure may justify causing distress to animals. Moreover, this view does 
not preclude the killing of animals, but it does demand that the killing should 
not cause fear or suffering, if possible" (DFG, 2016, p. 43). 
In these texts, the argument that justifies animal research relies on the 
ethical obligation of a profession, which considers the performance of animal 
experiments the best scientific standard. In other words, the standard of ac­
cepting and promoting some animal experiments is described as a scientific 
standard, since animal experiments are considered the epistemically best way 
to achieve certain goals. In addition, the commitment of maintaining good 
animal welfare is an ethical concern but always subordinate to that of the best 
science. However, it is not only the professional obligation of scientists to use 
the best standards at a given time which justifies animal experiments. The pro­
fessional obligation is based on a more general framework on human-animal 
relationships, which is anthropocentric at its core. It is a form of (unqualified) 
speciesism, i.e., the unjustified disadvantageous treatment or consideration 
of those who do not belong to, or are not categorized as belonging to, a cer­
tain species ( or group of species). Richard Frey ( 2005) refers to this position 
as guided by the "argument from benefit" that is derived from utilitarianism, 
which justifies the infliction of pain on animals to serve different goals, and is 
combined with speciesism, which states that a species belonging (i.e. human) 
justifies a different ethical treatment. Indeed, in the case of animals, the cost­
benefit-analysis is accepted; whereas, in the case of humans, it is not: "utilitari­
anism for animals, Kantianism for people," as Nozick ( 1974, p. 39) put it. Cohen 
(1986) offers a similar defense for animal experiments. Contesting the idea of 
animal rights because animals lack the capacity to make moral claims, Cohen 
has argued that we have a strong duty to conduct such experiments to alleviate 
human suffering and extend human lives. 
In summary, defense of animal research is derived from a combination of 
scientific reasons (the best possible standard at a given time), the ethical obli­
gation of scientists as a professional community ( to respect the best possible 
standards), and speciesism. Although the arguments for animal experiments 
are accepted by many in society, particularly in terms of regulations and exper­
imental practice, arguments against animal experiments have a long history 
and have been articulated in different texts and campaigns worldwide. The 
following sections distinguish between two main arguments against animal 
experimentation, epistemic ( also called, epistemic antivivisectionism) and ethi­
cal ( also called, ethical antivivisectionism ). 
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At the core of the epistemic critique of animal experiments is the idea that 
such experiments are bad science. Bad is used as a synonym for inefficient, sci­
entifically wrong, or misleading. This kind of critique has a long history. Be­
tween the third and fourth centuries, BCE, the empiric school of the Ancient 
Greek rejected the study of anatomical and physiological vivisection, due both 
to its cruelty and the belief that pain and death would distort the normal ap­
pearance of internal organs. In more recent times, some animal welfare and 
animal rights organizations and philosophers have used examples from the 
history of biomedical experimentation, and retrospective studies on the influ­
ence of animal experiments in human medicine, to criticize the practice. The 
Italian philosopher, Croce ( 2000 ), coined the term, scientific antivivisectionism 
( antivivisezionismo scientifico ), as a rejection of the idea of the transferability 
of results from one species to another. According to this rationale, modern 
animal models are of limited use and can even be dangerous because the data 
produced are not easily translatable to humans ( Croce, 2000; Gericke and Re­
inke, 2011; cf. Pappworth, 1968). 
For Lafollette and Shanks (1996) and Greek and Greek (2003) the idea of 
the unavoidability of animal experiments is misleadingly taken as the "gold 
standard" within the scientific community. At the center of this critique is the 
deconstruction of the claim that animal experiments in biomedicine are pre­
dictive of human conditions. Lafollette and Shanks (2004; 2006) provide a cri­
tique of the use of animal models based on evolutionary theory. They observe 
that phylogenetically related animals have different mechanisms to achieve 
the same biological functions, a phenomenon they call "causal-functional 
asymmetry". This phenomenon renders cross-species extrapolations as causal 
explanations impossible. Knowledge of relevant causal differences, i.e., causal 
dis-analogies (with respect to mechanisms and pathways), which compro­
mise the usefulness of analogical reasoning, is necessary; however, this knowl­
edge is only possible retrospectively, once a property has already been tested 
on different species. Lafollette and Shanks (1996) argue that the defense of 
animal experimentation relies on a scientifically misleading interpretation 
of the epistemic role of animal models in biomedical research. They explain 
that this defense is a product of Claude Bernard's legacy, which is based on 
a hypothetical-deductivist method in biomedicine, coupled with a rejection 
of statistical laws. Bernard assumed that clinical medicine (including epide­
miological studies) could never be a genuine science and believed in the in­
terchangeability of species to test clinical hypotheses (Lafollette and Shanks, 
1996). 
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The argument defending the unavoidability of animal experiments is based 
on the confusion between what are known as causal-analogic models (cAMs) 
and hypothetical animal models (HAMs). Historically, some animal experi­
ments were consistent with hypothetical-deductive methods, in that they were 
useful to gain knowledge. However, in the present day, with scientific and tech­
nical advancements in alternative methods, the potential of molecular biology 
( together with proteomics and genomics, among others), as well as computer 
models, animal models have become obsolete and poor scientific practice. 
As a result, scientists who promote animal models are not adhering to good 
scientific practice, and continued use of animal models may prevent the at­
tainment of human-relevant results. This critique is apparent in the current 
debate on the promotion of alternative methods within regulatory toxicology. 
For example, Hartung (2013) has spoken of "toxic ignorance" and the necessity 
for a paradigm shift in the twenty-first century that moves away from animal 
use and embraces new non-animal technologies. 
The epistemic critique of animal experiments is supported by considerable 
literature from retrospective studies, which have established the poor clini­
cal value of animal models (Pound et al. , 2004). Though beyond the scope of 
this chapter, this literature reaches a sobering conclusion that, in many cases, 
animal experiments show poor methodological quality, problems with evalu­
ation, and limitations of false-positive or false-negative results. Furthermore, 
there is a visible lack of consistency between the results of animal models and 
clinical trials, as well as a significant lack of transferability of results (Akhtar, 
2015; Knight, 2011). This demonstrates the need for a retrospective evaluation 
and critical appraisal of the benefits of animal experiments to facilitate a para­
digm shift towards non-animal and human-relevant approaches. 
4 The Ethical Critique of Animal Experiments 
The ethical critique of animal experiments is derived from reflection on the 
moral status of animals as sentient beings: animal experiments impose suf­
fering and death, so that the animals' interests are systematically violated. 
Hence, this practice is not justified, regardless of its "utility". This kind of cri­
tique can be traced to the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, when a rise 
in movements opposing cruelty to animals occurred, and men of letters in 
England denounced the brutality of animal experiments and openly opposed 
the Cartesian view of animals as automata (Maehle, 1990 ). The ethical cri­
tique of animal experiments explicitly denounces speciesism: "There is only 
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one serious moral defense of vivisection. That defense proceeds as follows. 
Human beings are better off because of vivisection. [ . . .  ] One thing should be 
immediately obvious. The benefits argument has absolutely no logical bear­
ing on the debate over animal rights. Clearly, all that the benefits argument 
could possibly show is that vivisection on nonhuman animals benefits human 
beings. What this argument cannot show is that vivisecting animals for this 
purpose is morally justified. Whether animals have rights is not a question 
that can be answered by saying how much vivisection benefits human beings" 
(Regan, 2004, p. 174). 
The ethical critique attacks the cost-benefits of the animal model in two 
ways: first, the thesis of inviolable animal rights (right to life and prohibition 
of the infliction of suffering) intrinsically excludes the institutionalization of a 
cost-benefit calculation (see Donaldson and Kymlicka, 2011). Second, because 
the ethical critique denounces that in animal experiments two incomparable 
magnitudes are compared: the direct, intentional, present infliction and killing 
of animals and the elaboration of methods to reach future anticipated knowl­
edge that can principally serve to protect humans. In other words, a conflict 
situation is constructed. Such attempts are part of a long-term strategy for the 
further development of scientific goals (Wolf, 1988), by which (perhaps) the 
suffering of some persons ( or some animals) can be prevented; and they can­
not, therefore, be viewed as a conflict of interest. In the institutionalized prac­
tice of animal experiments, animals are born to be experimental tools, they are 
bred for a purpose, and their biological nature is formed through the identity 
given to them by human use. If we recognize animals as bearers of fundamen­
tal rights, we cannot permit the institutionalization of a cost-benefit measure 
that violates their life and causes them suffering. The practice of animal ex­
perimentation is intrinsically unethical as it forges animals' identity, puts them 
in confinement, restricts their species-specific traits, and kills them. 
5 The Strengths and Pitfalls of the Epistemic and Ethical Critiques 
Both the epistemic and the ethical arguments have a long history in the cri­
tique of animal experiments. However, to facilitate a paradigm shift towards 
ending animal experiments, one must understand the weaknesses of these 
approaches. The epistemic critique of using animals strikes the scientific jus­
tification of animal experiments at its core, because it argues that these meth­
ods are simply not the best scientific standards at a given time. The rejection 
of professional standards is a strong claim because, as previously explained, 
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the argument in favor of animal experiments is built on professional ethics, in 
which ethical obligations are derived from epistemic standards. However, in 
an anti-speciesist framework, the apparent force of the epistemic argument 
becomes a weakness. The epistemic critique is often too general and runs the 
risk of making the same mistake as its opponents. There are cases in which 
knowledge can be transferred from animals to human beings. Since this cri­
tique contests a pro-animal experiment position on an empirical level, it runs 
the risk of failure in cases that animal models may be valuable. LaFollette and 
Shanks' (1994) critique of the predictability of animal models is based on bio­
medical research; however, when applied to the field of basic research, as well 
as cases of species-specific veterinary medicine, their argument is weaker (La­
Follette and Shanks, 1996). The experimental system in basic research centers 
on discovering new fields and new uses of knowledge. This characteristic, on 
the one hand, can permit the elaboration of more complex alternative meth­
ods that mimic dynamics and biological properties in efficient ways; however, 
on the other hand, it also leads to the establishment of new fields and new uses 
attached to animals. 
The second problem with the epistemic critique to animal experiments is 
that the rejection of speciesism appears to be subordinate to the argument of 
utility. The epistemic critique is directed towards the benefit side of the cost­
benefit-analysis but not the analysis in itself. The largest part of intended ben­
efits is human gain. As previously discussed, the protection of human health 
is the highest priority in the justification of animal use. Therefore, when dis­
cussing animal experiments with a rationale, it is close to impossible to reject 
them. It is important to note that scientists often acknowledge the limitations 
of their work and express rather modest claims in terms of the applicability of 
the outcomes of their studies. Nevertheless, they maintain that animal use is 
necessary and important. 
The ethical critique of animal experiments offers a strong case against ani­
mal experiments, because it refuses to use a cost-benefit model, which priori­
tizes human gains. However, the ethical critique is, at times, accused of not 
explicitly addressing the potential loss of knowledge from renouncing animal 
experiments. This is apparent in the accelerated development of non-animal 
alternatives since the European ban on cosmetic testing on animals: "Past ex­
perience demonstrates clearly that animal testing provisions in the cosmetics 
legislation have been a key accelerator in relation to the development of alter­
native methods and have sent a strong signal far beyond the cosmetics sector 
and far beyond Europe" (European Commission, 2013, p. 6). The human spirit 
is creative and to renounce particular strategies encourages other pathways of 
discovering and working. 
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Why are animal experiments considered by some as fundamental and im­
portant even though they have limitations? It is impossible to answer this 
question with reference to empirical results alone. This question is more rel­
evant to values and social goals. The praxis of animal research, of each kind 
of experimental practice, is a practice in a given time and space in society, 
and it is a reflection of epistemic and ethical values. Scientific practices are 
not free of ethical values because: (1) they use limited cognitive and finan­
cial resources ( and thus it is always a matter of choice in which direction 
these resources should go); and ( 2) research activities reflect our values; that 
is, what we are willing to do in a society, what we consider as an acceptable 
means to reach an end. When we accept the infliction of pain on and killing 
of sentient beings, we embrace these values as a society. This is apparent in 
the justification framework of the Declaration of Helsinki. Since the carrying 
out of animal research is a matter of a professional ethics ( despite the possibil­
ity of adjustments if, for example, the experiments are not designed properly), 
once these experiments meet current scientific standards, it is more difficult 
to criticize them. Therefore, as long as the infliction of harm on animals is 
justified, as long as animals are ontologically thought of as "research tools", 
animal use continues. Thus, overconfidence in animal experiments as scientific 
techniques is profoundly linked with an instrumental view of animals and life 
in general. 
The fundamental decision on the acceptability of the infliction of suffering 
and the killing of animals is a reflection of a social order and, of course, not 
solely a matter of empirical evidence. As a result, the necessity or inevitability 
of a scientific experiment is always a product of decisions and negotiations in 
a society. In the case of human clinical trials, there are also considerations of 
possible benefits and costs (in term of risks for the patient); but the situation 
is fundamentally different because the life and well-being of human beings is 
considered more significant than those of animals. For example, in the ethi­
cal literature about human clinical trials, the language used to contest some 
experiments is fundamentally different, and it often refers to vulnerabilities 
and possible abuses of particular populations and groups. The vulnerability of 
animals, in contrast, is simply taken for granted in the experimental system. 
Inasmuch as the idea of human exceptionalism is a political idea (ideology), 
the possibility of strictly distinguishing epistemic reasons from ethical reasons 
permits a division of moral labor ( e.g., "I conduct science and do not engage 
with ethical problems, it is not in my field of expertise"), which is highly prob­
lematic and, therefore, rejected for human clinical trials. 
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The dispute on animal experiments cannot be a dispute on (objective) ben­
efits; it is a dispute on what we as a society want to justify as practices and how 
we treat the living beings who are a part of it. Science and its practices are a 
social project. Can humankind benefit from animal abuse? This fundamental 
political nature of the category of necessity calls for a political critique of ani­
mal experiments, a critique that combines both the ethical and the epistemic 
critical arguments, acknowledging the non-neutrality of scientific decisions. 
An ethical critique to animal use is weaker, if it is not combined with a cri­
tique of the system of experimentation, i.e. the epistemic culture of animal 
experiments. At the same time, the epistemic critique should free itself from 
the reference to the category of utility as if it were solely a matter of scientific 
evidence; resulting in an impasse in front of scientific papers which recognize 
the limitations of animal models and their perceived importance at the same 
time, depending on the mechanisms investigated. As previously noted, the 
choice of renouncing animal experiments in favor of non-animal methods is 
fundamentally a political choice; this choice should be accompanied by the 
development of infrastructures and programs to serve as incentives for sci­
entific advancement, and by a new ethos of the scientific community. While 
these needs have been previously recognized by authors defining animal use 
as poor science ( e.g., Lafollette and Shanks, 1996; Greek and Greek, 2003), it is 
also important to recognize the political nature of the category of necessity in 
the experimental practice. 
A political critique of animal use strives to substitute the epistemic and 
ethical culture of animal experiments with a culture of compassion and soli­
darity, independent of the species-belonging. A political critique of animal ex­
perimentation rejects the fundamental subjugation of animal interests "just 
because they are animals" and openly argues for the establishment of a differ­
ent ethical culture. In order to be effective, the political critique must admit 
that it is necessary to give up certain pathways to knowledge while, at the 
same time, establishing a system in which it is possible to research and de­
velop technologies without violating the fundamental interests and rights of 
animals. 
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